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Abstract  
The empirical findings of this paper offer different perspective on the emerging literature 
on trade and disasters that based on contradictory and inconclusive evidence has argued 
that natural disasters reduce trade. We use succinct import demand and export supply 
functions providing an alternative methodological approach to the question of the 
impact of disasters on trade flows that has so far been mainly studied by gravity models. 
Our finding is that disasters are associated with higher import growth and higher export 
growth. Analysing a panel data set for 63 countries and the years 1970-2014 we find that 
natural disasters are associated with a positive shift in real annual growth rates of imports 
(an increase of 1.6 percentage points) and exports (an increase of 1.9 percentage points). 
Regarding imports, our findings reflect that disasters imply the need for reconstruction 
and imports to replace domestic production destroyed by the disaster. For exports, our 
results are in line with the Schumpeterian destructive creation hypothesis and reflect that 
more autocratic regimes are able to give priority to reconstruction and survival of the 
export sector. Our econometric analysis offers support for the existence of nonlinearities 
between disaster impact on exports and level of development. We do not find support 
for the idea that FDI stocks enhance trade resilience. 
Keywords  
Natural disaster; Trade shock; Export; Import; Resilience  
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1. Introduction  
Disruption of international trade and investment flows is a topic of growing concern, 
both in science and in policy-making. Trade disruptions have risen on the research 
agenda due to three factors. Firstly, the 2008/9 trade collapse (that reduced real global 
trade by about twenty per cent in only a few months) has stimulated new research on 
trade uncertainty (Grossman and Meissner 2010, van Bergeijk 2010, Wagner et al. 2013, 
Bloom 2014, Novy and Tailor 2014)). The trade collapse turned out to be a short to 
medium term phenomenon: by November 2010 real world imports had reached the 
April 2008 peak level again and the trade collapse is thus best considered as a one off 
shock.1 Secondly, a substantial increase in economic sanctions (boycotts and embargoes) 
and sanction threats can be observed (Figure 1). The increase in sanction frequency 
reflects geopolitical factors (such as the end of the superpower conflict in the 1990s), 
economic factors (globalization) as well as a greater efficacy in implementation, especially 
regarding multilateral sanctions (Biersteker and van Bergeijk 2015). 
 
Figure 1:Sanction frequency per decade worldwide 
 
Source:http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/TIES.htm 
 
Thirdly, economic security and economic vulnerability have become important 
issues for research and policy in particular with a view on resilience and prevention of 
trade disruptions (van Bergeijk and Moons 2008, van Bergeijk and Lazzaroni 2015).  
So far, the interest regarding trade disruption has been mainly focused on manmade 
shocks (including those due to malfunctioning of the economic system), where rich and 
comprehensive literatures have emerged. In this paper we will focus on natural disasters 
and their impact on trade (both imports and exports). We think that this is a topic 
worthy of investigation, firstly, because causality may be an issue in manmade shocks 
                                                 
1 Note, however, that the growth rate of world trade has slowed down substantially (Hoekman 
2015).  
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and, secondly, because the empirical literature on this topic is scarce. Table 1 lists the 
available econometric multi-country studies. These studies provide econometric models 
of trade flows containing an indicator that indicates the occurrence and severity of a 
natural disaster. The models have a geographical dimension and include distance either 
between the trade partners (Gassebner et al, 2010, and Oh and Reuveny 2010 use a 
gravity trade model) or between the trade partners and the centre of the disaster (Pelli 
and Tschopp 2013 and include controlling variables related to production (capacity), (per 
capita) GDP and area and location.2 Major differences occur with respect to the period 
of the sample, the country coverage and the inclusion or non-inclusion of a political 
variable.  
  
Table 1: Overview of empirical multi-country trade studies on the impact of disasters 
 Dependent 
variable 
political 
variable 
period Country 
coverage 
N 
Heger et al. (2008) Import, Export 
share in GDP 
no 1970-2006 16 countries 363 
Gassebner et al 
(2010) 
real level of 
bilateral 
imports 
democracy 1962-2004 176 exporters 
163 importers 
281762 
Oh and Reuveny 
(2010) 
Real bilateral  
imports 
political 
safety 
1985-2003 116 countries 127270 
Pelli and Tschopp 
(2012) 
change in log 
export value 
no 1995-2005 38 countries 679056 
As with any emerging new field in Economic Science, the findings are too 
heterogeneous to arrive at a consensus, although this is hardly noted due to the 
unambiguous conclusions that the authors themselves draw from their findings. 
Gassebner et al (2010, 351) report: “As a conservative estimate, an additional disaster 
reduces imports on average by 0.2% and exports by 0.1%)”. Likewise, Oh and Reuveny 
(2010, 251) conclude: “an increase in climatic disasters (…) for either the importer or 
exporter countries reduces their bilateral trade.”  
In our opinion the empirical evidence does not support these conclusions, especially 
since the conclusions are based on an analysis of the importing country (the destination 
of the trade flow) and cannot be generalised to the export country (the origin of the trade 
flow). Moreover, the parameters reported in these two studies on balance show opposite 
signs for origin and destination of the trade flows. Table 2 and 3 summarizes these 
parameter estimates.3  
                                                 
2 The gravity models, moreover, employ a number of traditional variables such as common language, 
being landlocked, common borders, colonial past and economic integration 
3 Pelli and Tschopp (2012) investigate exports but do not report destination and origin effects. 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates reported in empirical multi-country studies on the impact of disasters on imports 
 Disaster specification   including political 
variable 
    disaster in disaster in 
    destination origin destination origin 
Gassebner et al (2010) Natural and 
technological 
country-specific  0.006 -0.001 0.024** -0.019* 
Pair-specific  -0.004 -0.006 0.011 -0.018** 
country-specific country size 
correction 
0.43 -1.983*** 1.499* -2.655*** 
Pair-specific 0.208 -2.052*** 2.052*** -2.79*** 
devastating country-specific  0.011 -0.006 0.023*** -0.023*** 
Pair-specific  0.002 -0.008 0.012 -0.017** 
country-specific country size 
correction 
0.627* -0.955** 0.877** -0.884** 
Pair-specific 0.399 -0.884** 0.935*** -0.965** 
Oh and Reuveny (2010) Geophysical and 
climatic 
isolated geophysical   0.0053 0.0216*** 
combined geophysical 0.034 0.0199** -0.0268*** -0.0059** 
combined climatic -0.0273*** -0.0062** 0.0059 0.0223*** 
Heger et al 2008 catastrophic OLS Direct 1.99***    
OLS Lag 1 period 1.14*    
OLS Lag 2 periods  -2.54***    
OLS Lag 3periods -0.49    
GMM Direct 5.08*    
GMM Lag 1 period 0.64    
GMM Lag 2 periods -2.78**    
GMM Lag 3 periods -0.71    
“most precise estimate” 0.023***    
***= 99% confidence  **=95%  *=90% 
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Table 3: Parameter estimates reported in empirical multi-country studies on the impact of disasters on imports 
 disaster specification impact 
Heger et al 2008 catastrophic OLS Direct 1.07** 
OLS Lag 1 period -1.04* 
OLS Lag 2 periods -0.16 
GMM Direct 1.88 
GMM Lag 1 period -1.10* 
GMM Lag 2 periods -0.19 
“most precise estimate” 0.01 
Pelli and Tschopp (2012) hurricanes static baseline Developing  countries -1.116 
static baseline all countries -0.587 
dynamic baseline -1.116 
dynamic convergence -1.023*** 
dynamic convergence 3 periods -2.075*** 
***= 99% confidence  **=95%  *=90% 
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In Table 2 we see that for the disaster-hits-destination effect the majority of the 
reported parameters (18) are positive and 8 of these coefficients are significantly positive 
at the usual confidence levels as compared to only 2 significantly negative coefficients. 
Note, moreover, that Heger et al (2008), using a different methodology without origin 
effects for a sub sample of Caribbean countries, report positive impacts on imports in 
the first and second period (Table 2). For the disaster-hits-origin effect the opposite occurs: 
only 2 significantly positive coefficients against 16 significantly negative coefficients. 
Importantly, the interpretation of the disaster-hits-origin effect should not be that it shows 
that disasters reduce exports. All that has been shown, is that importers reduce their 
demand from exporters that have been hit by disasters.4 Only the parameters reported in 
Table 3 can be interpreted as genuine disaster impact on export estimates. Here the 
evidence again is mixed. 
The conclusions of the studies by Oh and Reuveny (2010) and Gassebner et al 
(2010) are widely cited in the literature (google scholar citations are 39 and 61, 
respectively, end of August 2016). The dominant view of the profession seems to be that 
disasters in general tend to be negative for trade. This paper adds to the existing 
empirical literature by providing an analysis of disasters with an alternative methodology 
(succinct import and an export models) for a more comprehensive country sample (197 
countries) and a longer and more recent period (1970 to 2014 inclusive). The analysis is 
exploratory in nature and aims at distilling stylized facts and identifying research puzzles 
for further research. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
dealing with mechanisms that create positive and/or negative impacts on exports and 
imports. Section 3 introduces and discusses our data sources. Section 4 discusses our 
empirical strategy and Section 5 provides and discusses our empirical findings. Section 6 
suggests avenues for further research. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Impact on trade  
Typically, disasters are seen as disruptions of normal economic activity due to loss of 
production, human and physical capital and/or infrastructure. Geophysical disasters 
(earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.) and floods destroy or limit the use of roads, 
bridges, air space, telecommunication and harbours increasing the logistic costs and thus 
have a negative impact on both imports and exports (Gassebner et al. 2010; Oh and 
Reuveny 2010; Martincus and Blyde 2013, Hayakawa et al 2015). Meta-analyses of some 
                                                 
4 The interference in the literature could only be made in the absence of a) zero flows, b) fully 
symmetric trade matrices and c) symmetric trade costs of disasters, which apparently is not the case. 
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sixty empirical studies on the impact of natural disasters have established a significant 
direct impact on Gross Domestic Product (Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk 2013and van 
Bergeijk and Lazzaroni 2015) reflecting both loss of life and capital goods and the 
disturbance of daily life. Assuming that the ensuing reduction of GDP (per capita) results 
in lower effective demand (consumption, investment and public expenditure due to 
lower tax receipts), Oh and Reuveny (2010) and Gassebner et al (2010) expect that 
disasters will have a negative impact on import demand. Moreover, Oh and Reuveny 
2010) point out that disasters may lead to collapsing markets (due to the demoralizing 
effect of disasters) and the disappearance of markets adds to increased trade uncertainty 
that is already higher due to the occurrence of the disaster. This leads to higher risk 
premiums and trading costs and thus to lower exports and import.  
Adam (2012), Oh and Reuveny (2010) and Gassebner et al (2010), however, 
recognize that a disaster will shift up the import demand function in order to replace lost 
production and production capacity. Reconstruction requires imports and foreign firms 
may fill in the gap that domestic firms cannot fill. More counterintuitive is that disasters 
may also have positive effects on the supply side of the economy and thereby on exports. 
Pelli and Tschopp (2012) point out the creative destruction aspect of natural disasters: 
replacing old capital goods by new capital goods, incorporating recent technology, may 
increase productivity. Pelling et al (2002) argue that policy-makers will give priority to 
export sectors. Finally, with domestic markets under pressure, firms may allocate output 
to foreign markets that was previously destined to domestic markets.  
 
2.2 Controlling factors 
The literature suggests three factors that influence the effects of natural disasters on 
trade: the level of economic development, the availability and level of FDI and political 
institutional conditions. The three factors relate to the country hit by a natural disaster. 
2.2.1 Level of development (GDPpc, OECD dummy and LDC dummy) 
The influence of the level of (economic) development on the economic impact of 
external shocks (natural disasters) is complex. A higher level of development is 
associated with better and well-established warning and reaction systems (Elliott, 2012). 
It is often assumed that OECD countries typically are more diversified with sounder 
macroeconomic structures, better functioning markets and more scope for 
macroeconomic management (see Briguglio et al, 2009, for a relevant ranking of 86 
countries in the early 2000s that substantiates this hypothesis).  
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The empirical evidence, however, is mixed.5 According to Noy (2009), “a disaster of 
similar magnitude affects a developing country more significantly than a developed one”. 
His study indicates that higher per capita income is “important in preventing negative 
impacts of natural disasters”. In contrast, Padli and Habibullah (2009) for Asia over the 
years 1970 to 2005 find “an inverse proportion between economic development and 
disaster resistance”. In other words, a lower level of development appears to be 
associated with higher disaster resilience. According to Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008), 
the relationship is non-linear. We take this on board by including per capita GDP 
simultaneously linearly and squared and additionally we use dummy variables for OECD 
membership and LDC status. As discussed before, OECD membership implies better 
macroeconomic and structural conditions to mitigate disasters. LDC status indicates 
better access to foreign aid. (Note, however, that the impact of aid may be ambiguous – 
see e.g. Rajan and Subramanian, 2008. And that developing country classification and 
access to financial instruments is complicated by overlap and multi-status countries, see 
e.g. Fialho and Bergeijk, 2016.) In view of the above, we will investigate non-linear 
relationships between disaster impact and the level of GDP per capita that we include 
both linearly and squared. 
2.2.2 FDI  
The literature on FDI and natural disasters typically investigates how natural disasters 
influence FDI. The general finding is that disaster occurrence and higher disaster 
frequency reduce FDI inflows for the country hit by a disaster. We depart from this 
literature and focus on how FDI levels before the disaster may influence disaster impact.6 
Raschky, and Schwindt. (2009) investigate a similar change in perspective from the 
foreign post disaster aid analysed in the mainstream literature, as they study the impact of 
foreign pre-disaster development aid on disaster outcome. This change in perspective 
may be highly relevant for FDI which is not only important as a financial flow, but also 
because it brings market access, commitment by private partners potentially ensuring 
continuation of investment and risk-sharing (in a low-profit or loss situation the level of 
repayment of profits will be adjusted downwardly). Long-run relationships – emerging in 
international value chains – may indeed help to reduce the costs of disasters for the 
country that is hit by the disaster and speed up economic recovery and reconstruction by 
bringing in new technology and encouraging new industries.7 FDI, however, also creates 
                                                 
5 Incidentally, this empirical inconclusiveness does not only occur for natural disasters but also for 
man-made disasters such as the Great Recession. See Davies, (2011), Didier et al. (2012) and van Bergeijk 
(2015). 
6 See also Andergassen, and. Sereno, 2014 for an analysis of private firm decision making on 
mitigation investment in the context of different forms of financial support by donors. 
7 See van Bergeijk 2012 for an analysis that shows the dampening effect of international value chains 
in the downturn of the 2008/9 world trade collapse. 
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vulnerabilities and may actually dry up in the wake of a disaster. In this respect it is 
important to distinguish between the pre-crisis stock of FDI and the change in that stock 
(the flow of FDI) after the disaster.8 
 
2.2.3 Political institutions and trade uncertainty due to disasters 
The literature on the impact of disasters often considers political institutions. The 
seminal study is Kahn (2005) who finds that countries that are more democratic 
experience lower death counts. Similar results, accounting for democracy have been 
found by Keefer et al. (2011), Escaleras et al. (2007) and Raschky (2008), In contrast, 
Yamamura (2011a, 2011b) finds a negative and significant effect for democracy per se, but 
also that law and order and quality of government reduce disaster impact. As already 
discussed in the introduction, recent literature that links trade collapses in general to an 
underlying increase in trade uncertainty finds that trade shocks have a stronger impact in 
democracies (see van Bergeijk 2015 for a discussion)..   
In conclusion:  
 the empirical literature on the level of development is inconclusive, suggesting a 
non-linear relationship 
 the existing empirical literature on FDI and natural disasters agrees on a positive 
association (based on the assumption that natural disasters influence FDI 
decisions), but the impact of pre-disaster FDI is under-researched and not 
unambiguous 
 political factors suggest that the impact trade shocks is larger the more 
democratic the country that is hit by the disaster. 
 
3. Data description  
Our sample is restricted by data availability due to the fact that multiple data sources 
were used. We have complete data for 63 countries (Appendix A). Exclusions from the 
dataset are mainly due to lacking or incomplete data in the World Development 
Indicators. The excluded countries are either very small countries with small 
populations and little international economic activities or countries that stopped to exist 
during the research period, e.g. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, 
former Yugoslavia and Eastern Germany.  
                                                 
8 An additional argument is that FDI stocks are measured more accurately than FDI flows (see van 
Bergeijk 1995). 
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Table 3: Variables—Descriptions and Sources (Data for 1970-2014 inclusive) 
Variable Description  Source 
IMPORT Import annual growth rate (constant prices) WDI 
EXPORT Export annual growth rate (constant prices) WDI 
GDPGROWTH  GDP real annual growth rate WDI 
GDPpc Log of GDP per capita  WDI 
OECD Dummy = 1 if the country is an OECD 
member in a specific year, else 0 
OECD 
LDC Dummy=1 if the country is a  LDC in a 
specific year, else 0 
UN 
FDI STOCK One year lag of FDI stock in % of GDP UNCTAD STAT 
POLITY2 One year lag of institutional indicator (10 is 
most democratic level -10 is most autocratic) 
Center for 
Systemic Peace  
DISASTER Annual disaster frequency EM-DAT 
 
The dependent variable, the import or export annual growth rate, is measured in 
constant US$. The value represents all goods and services received from or sold to the 
rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, 
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. The data exclude 
compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and 
transfer payments. 
The natural disaster dataset EM-DAT is the most comprehensive dataset and the 
most commonly used data source in the relevant literature (see Lazzaroni and van 
Bergeijk 2014 for a discussion). EM-DAT provides country data for various indicators of 
natural disasters distinguished by 11 types. It also provides detailed information on e.g. 
total death, injured, total affected, total damage, etc. We will, however, be most interested 
in how the total occurrence of natural disaster impacts on trade flows. Therefor we 
created the variable DISASTER as the total number of natural disaster happening to a 
country within one year. We decided to drop two types of disasters: "animal accident", 
(Niger, 2014, total death 12, DISASTER 1,) and "impact" (Russian, 2013, total death 0, 
DISASTER 1, affected 30000). These disaster types only have one observation each in 
EM-DAT. 
For the economic variables we use the World Development Indicators, with the 
exception of the FDI stock in percent of GDP which is taken from United Nations 
Conference On Trade and Development which has a slightly better coverage. Moreover, 
the institutional dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace only covers countries with 
“total population greater than 500,000” (167 countries in 2014). We use the variable 
polity2 as a measure for the political-institutional framework.  
 14 
Our dataset consists of 197 countries, for the years 1970 - 2014 inclusive. Data for 
lagged variables were collected also for 1969 so that the starting point of the analysis is 
1970. Due to missing observations our panel is not balanced. Moreover, we are missing 
many small, island economies that tend to have more disasters (particularly storms, 
floods, etc). Note that due to data availability for specific variables, the number of 
included observations can change for different specifications of our regression models. 
4. Empirical Strategy  
In developing our model, we use a step-by-step approach starting with a very small 
model that we extend by incorporating controlling variables and then move towards 
investigating natural disasters with these factors in order to test if the controlling 
variables mitigate disaster impact. 
Our core relation relates the rate of change 𝛾𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 for imports and exports to the 
rate of change of GDP. In the former case the relationship reflects a simple traditional 
import demand function and in the latter case it reflects a simple traditional export 
supply function. We add the variable of interest DISASTER, that indicates if the country 
has been hit by (a) natural disaster(s).  
 
𝛾𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀  (1) 
 
To this core model we add controlling variables including the level of development 
(per capita GDP, linearly and squared), Foreign Direct Investment and institutional 
factors (our measure is an indicator for autocracy and democracy). Initially we use these 
variables simply as controlling factors (as a robustness check we will also add dummy 
variables for LDCs and OECD member states). 
 
𝛾𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 
+𝛽3 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝜀  (2) 
 
We do not only test DISASTER as a shift dummy but also include slope dummies 
in order to test for different relationships in periods with and without shock. 
 
𝛾𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡
2       +
       𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡   + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 +  𝛽10 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀   (3) 
 
We estimate this model for 3 periods: 1970-2014 and to check for robustness also 
two sub-periods 1970-2008 (our motivation is to exclude the exceptional trade collapse 
in 2008/9 and the ensuing trade slowdown) and 1990-2014 (our motivation is to exclude 
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the pre-1990 period of the Cold War). We always add fixed time and country effects in 
the estimated equations.  
5.  Empirical Findings 
Tables 4 (imports) and 5 (exports) report the empirical findings for equations 1 and 2 of 
the three periods. We focus attention on the full period 1970-2014 and then use the 
estimates for 1970-2008 to check for the potential impact of the global trade collapse in 
2008/9 and the ensuing trade slowdown in the 2010s. We also provide the estimates for 
1990-2014 that include both the period of strong globalization up till and including 2008 
and the phase of deglobalization that seems to have set in after that year. While the 
explanatory power of the equation is low, the F-statistics show that it is significant in 
what it explains. The findings in Table 4 and 5 always report positive and highly 
significant coefficients (p<0.01) for GDPGROWTH, and POLITY2 (only exception is 
POLITY2 in export model in Table 2 with p<0.1) confirming a priori expectation.9 The 
non-linearity identified in the literature with respect to GDPpc is confirmed in both 
models for the periods 1970-2014 and 1990-2014 at p<0.01, but not for the period 
1950-2008 where the non-linearity is insignificant suggesting the need for cautious 
interpretation10. For FDISTOCK we always find a significantly positive coefficient p<0.1 
and often better). 
Regarding the variable of interest, DISASTER, we find significantly positive 
coefficients for 1970-2014 and 1970-2008, but not for equation 2 in the years 1990-2014 
where the coefficient is positive but insignificant at the usual significance levels (i.e. 
p>0.1). One possible explanation for the less significant results for 1990-2014 is that 
during this period, DISASTER becomes less important to other shocks and potential 
drivers. For 1970-2014, a change of DISASTER from 0 to 1 increases the real rate of 
import growth by 100(e0.223 – 1) or 25%. The average import growth rate for all countries 
over 1970-2014 in our dataset is 6.28 per cent per annum so the increase due to one 
occurrence is 1.6 percentage points11. For 1970-2014, an increase for DISASTER from 0 
to 1 enlarges the real rate of export growth by 100(e0.255 – 1) or 29%. The average export 
growth rate in our dataset is 6.4 per cent per annum so the increase due to one 
occurrence is 1.9 percentage points. 
                                                 
9 An increase of POLITY2 by 1 point higher (becomes more democratic) increases real import 
growth by about 3 to 4percentage points. 
10 OECD membership or LDC status and FDI flows are insignificant bot for exports and imports. 
Adding them as control variables does also not significantly influence the coefficients of other variables.  
11 Note that the effect of a decrease of occurrence is not symmetric. It amounts to 100(e – 0.223 – 1) or 
-20% which amounts to 1.3 percentage points. The impact also appears to be larger and more significant 
for 1970-2008 that excludes the global trade collapse and its aftermath.  
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Table 4:   Panel estimates for annual real import growth (1970-2014) 
 
 
  
 
1970-2014 1970-2008 1990-2014 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
DISASTER 0.223** 0.195* 0.299*** 0.234* 0.253* 0.164 
 
(2.17) (1.67) (2.62) (1.76) (1.84) (1.18) 
GDPGROWTH 0.309*** 0.265*** 0.428*** 0.405*** 0.221*** 0.166*** 
 
(8.20) (6.31) (10.06) (8.34) (4.99) (3.60) 
GDPpc 
 
-0.773*** 
 
-0.398* 
 
-1.613*** 
  
(-4.74) 
 
(-1.86) 
 
(-6.88) 
GDPpc2 
 
0.00698*** 
 
0.00369 
 
0.0136*** 
  
(3.45) 
 
(1.40) 
 
(4.88) 
FDISTOCK 
 
0.0260** 
 
0.0417*** 
 
0.0221* 
  
(2.29) 
 
(2.84) 
 
(1.69) 
POLITY2 
 
0.416*** 
 
0.459*** 
 
0.422*** 
  
(5.88) 
 
(5.78) 
 
(3.73) 
FEE time, country yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 5277 3852 4368 3033 3509 3085 
R2 0.013 0.029 0.024 0.043 0.008 0.027 
F 36.06 18.98 54.20 22.71 14.50 14.01 
Note: t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 5,  Panel estimates for annual real export growth (1970-2014) 
 
1970-2014 1970-2008 1990-2014 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
DISASTER 0.255** 0.323*** 0.328*** 0.369*** 0.256* 0.196 
 
(2.57) (2.84) (3.08) (2.95) (1.89) (1.44) 
GDPGROWTH 0.204*** 0.182*** 0.371*** 0.365*** 0.142*** 0.127*** 
 
(5.61) (4.44) (9.36) (8.02) (3.25) (2.77) 
GDPpc 
 
-0.904*** 
 
-0.530*** 
 
-1.848*** 
  
(-5.67) 
 
(-2.65) 
 
(-7.96) 
GDPpc2 
 
0.00624*** 
 
0.00295 
 
0.0116*** 
  
(3.16) 
 
(1.19) 
 
(4.18) 
FDISTOCK 
 
0.0687*** 
 
0.0938*** 
 
0.0854*** 
  
(6.18) 
 
(6.80) 
 
(6.58) 
POLITY2 
 
0.178*** 
 
0.213*** 
 
0.185* 
  
(2.58) 
 
(2.87) 
 
(1.66) 
FEE time, country yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 5277 3852 4368 3033 3509 3085 
R2 0.007 0.029 0.022 0.049 0.004 0.039 
F 19.13 19.13 48.75 26.11 7.307 21.06 
Note: t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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5.1 Robustness 
While the estimates for different time periods in themselves already provide some 
indication for the robustness of our findings, we also experimented with different 
explanatory variables including FDI flows (rather than stocks) and dummy variables for 
OECD membership and LDC status. We also analysed different types of natural 
disasters but found no important differences regarding sign and significance of the 
estimated coefficients. Tables 6 and 7 offer an alternative test of robustness adding slope 
dummies in order to check for differences in relationship during a disaster. Table 6 
reports our findings for the import model. The slope dummies are insignificant but also 
note that DISASTER becomes insignificant. The other test statistics also suggest that the 
model with slope dummies is inappropriate. 
Table 6:  Panel estimates for annual real import growth (1970-2014) shift and slope dummies 
  1970-2014 1970-2008 1990-2014 
DISASTER 0.195* 0.183 0.234* 0.306 0.164 0.293 
 
-1.67 -0.98 -1.76 -1.45 -1.18 -1.37 
GDPGROWTH 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.405*** 0.404*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 
 
-6.31 -6.29 -8.34 -8.29 -3.6 -3.57 
GDPpc -0.773*** -0.768*** -0.398* -0.354 -1.613*** -1.640*** 
 
(-4.74) (-4.60) (-1.86) (-1.62) (-6.88) (-6.91) 
GDPpc2 0.00698*** 0.00703*** 0.00369 0.00338 0.0136*** 0.0137*** 
 
-3.45 -3.42 -1.4 -1.26 -4.88 -4.86 
FDISTOCK 0.0260** 0.0213* 0.0417*** 0.0383** 0.0221* 0.0201 
 
-2.29 -1.77 -2.84 -2.5 -1.69 -1.46 
POLITY2 0.416*** 0.420*** 0.459*** 0.433*** 0.422*** 0.491*** 
 
-5.88 -5.3 -5.78 -4.82 -3.73 -3.93 
GDPpc*DISASTER 
 
-0.0138 
 
-0.0235 
 
-0.0208 
 
(-0.52) 
 
(-0.77) 
 
(-0.71) 
GDPpc2*DISASTER 0.000211 
 
0.00028 
 
0.000437 
  
-0.38 
 
-0.42 
 
-0.69 
FDISTOCK*DISASTER 0.00625 
 
0.00387 
 
0.00394 
  
-1.2 
 
-0.63 
 
-0.7 
POLITY2*DISASTER -0.00494 
 
0.00663 
 
-0.0303 
  
(-0.31) 
 
-0.35 
 
(-1.46) 
N 3852 3852 3033 3033 3085 3085 
R-sq 0.029 0.029 0.043 0.044 0.027 0.028 
F 18.98 11.61 22.71 13.83 14.01 8.809 
Note: t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Panel estimates for annual real export growth (1970-2014) shift and slope dummies 
  1970-2014 1970-2008 1990-2014 
DISASTER 0.323*** 0.778*** 0.369*** 0.970*** 0.196 0.812*** 
 -2.84 -4.29 -2.95 -4.92 -1.44 -3.84 
GDPGROWTH 0.182*** 0.185*** 0.365*** 0.368*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 
 -4.44 -4.5 -8.02 -8.1 -2.77 -2.76 
GDPpc -0.904*** -0.869*** -0.530*** -0.439** -1.848*** -1.825*** 
 (-5.67) (-5.34) (-2.65) (-2.15) (-7.96) (-7.78) 
GDPpc2 0.00624*** 0.00553*** 0.00295 0.00178 0.0116*** 0.0105*** 
 -3.16 -2.76 -1.19 -0.71 -4.18 -3.77 
FDISTOCK 0.0687*** 0.0775*** 0.0938*** 0.107*** 0.0854*** 0.0973*** 
 -6.18 -6.62 -6.8 -7.46 -6.58 -7.16 
POLITY2 0.178*** 0.257*** 0.213*** 0.302*** 0.185* 0.282** 
 
-2.58 -3.32 -2.87 -3.6 -1.66 -2.28 
GDPpc*DISASTER -0.0364 
 
-0.0338 
 
-0.0577** 
  
(-1.41) 
 
(-1.19) 
 
(-2.00) 
GDPpc2*DISASTER 
 
0.000924* 
 
0.000857 
 
0.00136** 
  
-1.68 
 
-1.38 
 
-2.18 
FDISTOCK*DISASTER -0.0124** -0.0204*** -0.0142** 
  (-2.44)  (-3.53)  (-2.55) 
POLITY2*DISASTER 
 
-0.0381** 
 
-0.0456*** 
 
-0.0421** 
  
(-2.44) 
 
(-2.59) 
 
(-2.05) 
N 3852 3852 3033 3033 3085 3085 
R-sq 0.029 0.033 0.049 0.056 0.039 0.044 
F 19.13 13.02 26.11 17.94 21.06 14.32 
 
In contrast, Table 7 for exports reports both significant slope dummies and 
significant shift dummies. The interaction terms for GDPpc indicate that the non-linear 
association between disasters and level of development is stronger during disasters. For 
FDISTOCK and POLITY2 we find that a larger FDI stock in the year before the 
disaster and more democratic institutions are associated with lower export growth during 
disasters. We would like to point out that the fact that more democratic countries are less 
export resilient does not mean that more democratic countries are less resilient in 
general. Democracies may give priority to poverty alleviation while autocracies may 
stimulate export survival at the expense of the welfare of the population. 
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6 Conclusions and issues for further research 
The empirical findings of this paper offer an alternative perspective on the emerging 
literature on trade and disasters. In particular, we offer a different methodological 
approach to the question of the impact of disasters on trade flows that has been mainly 
studied by gravity models. Our finding is that disasters are associated with higher import 
growth and higher export growth. This finding only looks different from the results 
reported in the emerging literature because earlier researchers themselves have drawn the 
opposite conclusion that disasters reduce trade from empirical findings that actually are 
more in line with our findings and interpretation as we discussed earlier when we 
presented this literature in Tables 2 and 3. Regarding imports, our findings reflect that 
disasters imply the need for reconstruction and imports to replace domestic production 
that is destroyed by the disaster. For exports, our results are in line with the 
Schumpeterian destructive creation hypothesis and may also reflect that more autocratic 
regimes (with negative POLITY2 values) may be able to give priority to reconstruction 
and survival of the export sector. Our econometric analysis offer support for the 
existence of nonlinearities between disaster impact on exports and level of development. 
We do not find support for the idea that FDI stocks enhance trade resilience. 
We are well aware of the limitations of our small import demand and export supply 
models and acknowledge that the explanatory power of the models is low. For testing 
hypotheses regarding the sign of the impact of disasters on trade flows the approach is 
informative and acceptable, but clearly more research is needed on the underlying 
mechanisms. If anything more research for different countries and periods is necessary in 
view of the still limited amount of studies on this important topic.     
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Appendix A: List of countries included in dataset 
Afghanistan Kosovo 
Albania Kuwait 
Algeria Kyrgyz Republic 
Angola Lao PDR 
Argentina Latvia 
Armenia Lebanon 
Australia Lesotho 
Austria Liberia 
Azerbaijan Libya 
Bahamas, The Lithuania 
Bahrain Luxembourg 
Bangladesh Macao SAR, China 
Barbados Macedonia, FYR 
Belarus Madagascar 
Belgium Malawi 
Belize Malaysia 
Benin Maldives 
Bhutan Mali 
Bolivia Malta 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Martinique 
Botswana Mauritania 
Brazil Mauritius 
Brunei Darussalam Mexico 
Bulgaria Moldova 
Burkina Faso Mongolia 
Burundi Montenegro 
Cabo Verde Morocco 
Cambodia Mozambique 
Cameroon Myanmar 
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Canada Namibia 
Central African Republic Nepal 
Chad Netherlands 
Chile New Zealand 
China Nicaragua 
Colombia Niger 
Comoros Nigeria 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Norway 
Congo, Rep. Oman 
Costa Rica Pakistan 
Cote d'Ivoire Panama 
Croatia Papua New Guinea 
Cuba Paraguay 
Cyprus Peru 
Czech Republic Philippines 
Denmark Poland 
Djibouti Portugal 
Dominican Republic Puerto Rico 
Ecuador Qatar 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Romania 
El Salvador Russian Federation 
Equatorial Guinea Rwanda 
Eritrea Samoa 
Estonia Saudi Arabia 
Ethiopia Senegal 
Fiji Serbia 
Finland Seychelles 
France Sierra Leone 
Gabon Singapore 
Gambia, The Slovak Republic 
Georgia Slovakia 
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Germany Slovenia 
Ghana Somalia 
Greece South Africa 
Guatemala South Sudan 
Guinea Spain 
Guinea-Bissau Sudan 
Haiti Swaziland 
Honduras Sweden 
Hong Kong SAR, China Switzerland 
Hungary Syrian Arab Republic 
Iceland Tajikistan 
India Tanzania 
Indonesia Thailand 
Iran Timor-Leste 
Ireland Togo 
Israel Trinidad and Tobago 
Italy Tunisia 
Jamaica Turkey 
Japan Turkmenistan 
Jordan Uganda 
Kazakhstan Ukraine 
Kenya United Arab Emirates 
Korea, Dem. Rep. United Kingdom 
Korea, Rep. United States 
 Uruguay 
 Uzbekistan 
 Vanuatu 
 Venezuela, RB 
 Vietnam 
 Zambia 
 Zimbabwe  
